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RECENT DECISIONS
Markets." No rebutting facts were on the record.' 2  Certainly the
classification could not be declared arbitrary upon its face when the
court had available the data in the Nebbia and Borden Products
Corp. cases of which it could take judicial notice.13 The court has
held that a classification based upon a reasonable distinction is valid,
even though some inequalities result in practice.' 4 It has insisted that
nothing short of "a clear and hostile determination" is invalid.'15 The
object of time limitation in the Mayflower Farms case was not, as the
majority said, to give one class an economic advantage over another.
This may have resulted incidentally; the main object, of course, was
to relieve an economic situation which the court had already author-
ized the state legislature to do. The problem was one for the legis-
lature. When that body once determined that the time limitation had
a reasonable relation to its desired purpose, and the facts reasonably
justified that belief, it acted within its jurisdiction which the court
had no right to invade. 16 As indicated by the Mayflower Farms
case, the court may narrow its decision in the Nebbia case to a point
of ineffectiveness by rejection of detailed regulations which are num-
berless in some industries, particularly the milk industry.
17
T.B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS OF LAW-PRICE FIXING
--REGULATION OF LABOR CONDITIONs-BITUMINOUS COAL ACT.-
Plaintiff, as a stockholder, sues to enjoin the defendant company and
some of its officers from complying with the provisions of the Bitu-
' Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 267 N. Y. 9, 195 N. E. 532 (1935),
aff'g, 242 App. Div. 881, 275 N. Y. Supp. 669 (3d Dept. 1934).This is the reason for the decision in the Mayflower Farms case. But
the court has said in Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S.
580, 584, 55 Sup. Ct. 538, 540 (1935), "A statutory discrimination will not be
set aside as the denial of equal protection of the laws if any state of facts rea-
sonably may be conceived to justify it." It requires no convolutions of the
imagination to conceive a state of facts to justify the discrimination in the
Mayflower Farms case.
"WIG ORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2579.
" Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 33 Sup. Ct. 441 (1930).
'Bell's Gap. R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 237, 10 Sup. Ct. 533
(1890).
"'Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation (1924) 37 HARV. L. REv. 338. Dis-
senting in the A. A. A. case, Stone, J., said, "The power of courts to declare
a statute unconstitutional is subject to two guiding principles * * *. One is
that courts are concerned only with the power to enact statutes, not with their
wisdom. The other is that while unconstitutional exercise of power by the execu-
tive and legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial restraint,
the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-
restraint." United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936).
" Goldsmith and Winks, loc. cit. .rupra, note 2, at page 185. See (1936)
49 HARv. L. REv. 996.
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minous Coal Conservation Act of 1935.1 The Act declared the coal
industry to be affected with national public interest, and that its regu-
lation in respect to production, distribution of coal and labor rela-
tions was necessary to prevent waste and in order to permit proper
servicing for the public, owners, and employees. Twenty-three coal
districts covering the country were created, each with a district board
having power to fix minimum prices for coal at every coal mine. A
levy of 15% was to be made on the sale price of coal at each mine.
Rebates were to be allowed to those producers complying with the
code to be drafted by a National Bituminous Commission which also
had fact finding power upon which to base its pronouncements. The
labor provisions among other things authorized collective bargaining
among employees and permitted the fixing of hours and wages by
agreement between representatives of certain of the producers and
representatives of a certain number of employees. From a judgment
of the lower court, granting the injunction in part, and declaring the
Act to be partly unconstitutional, the parties appeal on cross-writs of
certiorari. Held, the Act, in its entirety is unconstitutional. Regula-
tion of interstate commerce does not include the power to regulate
labor conditions at coal mines; production of coal is local and is merely
antecedent to commerce and not commerce itself. Delegation of legis-
lative power to producers and employees to fix maximum hours and
minimum wages is violative of the Fifth Amendment. The price fix-
ing provisions are inextricably related to the labor provisions and
must therefore fall with them. Cardozo, Brandeis and Stone, JJ.,
dissented. Hughes, C. J., dissented in part. Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., - U. S. -, 56 Sup. Ct. 855 (1936).
This decision together with the New York Minimum Wage 2
decision have been denounced as creating a "no man's land" where
neither federal nor state government can regulate labor conditions.3
In effect, this "no man's land" becomes the domain of property,4 the
sanctity of which cannot be invaded by legislation espousing the needs
of labor. 5 And so it is that legislative power is made sterile by these
two decisions rendered by five to four votes. 6
The federal government has power to regulate interstate com-
1 Popularly referred to as the Guffey Coal Act, 49 Stat. -, 15 U. S. C. A.
§§ 801-27 (1935). See Note (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 493.
Morehead v. People ex rel. Tipaldo, - U. S. -, 56 Sup. Ct. 918 (1936).
'Comment by President Roosevelt, N. Y. Times, June 3, 1936, p. 1, col. 7.
'COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1934) chapter on the Nature of
Property; Pound, Liberty of Contract (1909), 18 YALE L. J. 454; Lerner,
Supreme Court and American Capitalism (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 668.
5 ELLIoTT, NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (1935); COMMONS, LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924) ; Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Real-
ism in Constitutional Law (1916) 29 HARV. L. REV. 353; cf. Sayre, Labor and
the Courts (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 682.
e BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932) ; Powell, Tudiciality of Mini-
inum Wage Legislation (1924) 37 HARV. L. REv. 545 (The author's discussion
of judicial "head counting" is interesting).
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merce and such matters as directly affect it. 7 Commerce may be pro-
tected against any dangers which threaten it and Congress may adopt
appropriate measures to effect this end.8 The exercise of this power
to regulate is subject to the constitutional restriction of the due process
clause.0 What constitutes "interstate commerce" and what directly
affects it are questions which have consistently plagued the courts.' 0
The record in the instant case indicated that the sales were for the
most part interstate sales and that the coal industry was affected with
a national public interest. More extensive findings were made by
the lower court."- Assuming these facts, the "causal relation" 12 be-
tveen price fixing and the sale of coal was such as to authorize con-
gressional regulation of prices. The principal opinion purports to
leave open the question of federal price fixing.13 It would seem that
price fixing in regard to wages or fixing of hours bears no legal dis-
tinction from fixing of prices in the sale of commodities.' 4 If one is
unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment, the other is also. Hav-
ing concluded that the production of coal was a matter of local con-
cern, it is difficult to perceive how the majority can in the future
logically declare the sale of coal to be a matter affecting interstate
commerce.'
3
'Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 398, 33 Sup. Ct. 729 (1913) ; Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (U. S. 1824).
' Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 51, 32 Sup. Ct. 169
(1912) ; Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 281 U. S.
548, 570, 50 Sup. Ct. 427 (1930).
' Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 40 Sup. Ct. 106
(1919); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. Co., 222 U. S.
541, 32 Sup. Ct. 108 (1912) ; St. Joseph Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 298
U. S. 38, 56 Sup. Ct. 720 (1936).
"0 Powell, Commerce, Pensions and Codes (1936) 49 HARv. L. R.v. 1, 193;
Frankfurter, Taney and the Commerce Clause (1936) 49 HAav. L. Rayv.. 1006;
Grant, Commerce, Productio , and the Fiscal Powers of Congress (1936) 45
YALE L. J. 751.
U Carter v. Carter Coal Co., - U. S. -, 56 Sup. Ct. 855, 861 (1936). See
12 F. Supp. 570 (W. D. Ky. 1935).
"In his dissenting opinion in the instant case, Cardozo, J., points out the
difficulty of attempting to determine what "directly" affects interstate commerce.
He says, "What the cases really mean is that the causal relation in such cir-
cumstances is so close and intimate and obvious as to permit it to be called
direct without subjecting the word to an unfair or excessive strain." Dis-
senting opinion, 56 Sup. Ct. 855, 880 (1936).
See note 15, infra.
"See the dissenting opinions of Stone, J., and Hughes, C. J., in Morehead
v. People ex rel. Tipaldo, - U. S. -, 56 Sup. Ct. 926, 932 (1936), which rely
heavily upon Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 56 Sup. Ct. 829 (1934), for
their conclusions.
"Sutherland, J., seems to cast doubt by innuendo concerning the constitu-
tionality of federal price fixing. Writing for the majority in the instant case,
he said: "The price fixing provisions of the code are thus disposed of without
coming to the question of their constitutiqnality; but neither this disposition of
the matter, nor anything we have said is to be taken as indicating that the court
is of opinion that these provisions, if separately enacted, could be sustained."
1936 ]
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A crude provision of the Act, justifiably attacked by the major-
ity, was the delegation of power to certain producers and mine work-
ers authorizing them to fix wages and hours. In the light of Panama
Oil Refining Co. v. Ryan "I and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States,'7 the provision was a display of poor judgment and policy.
The delegation was to a body, not impartial, but consisting of mem-
bers having conflicting interests with few defined standards to guide
its action.' 8 Conceding this weakness in the Act, the decision as a
whole, nevertheless, is unfortunate for its sweeping assertion of
"fundamental principles" which if applied literally will predestine
most future social legislation to death at inception.
T.B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-VALIDATION OF THE
NEW YORK UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAw.-Complainant at
Special Term sought a declaratory judgment nullifying the Unem-
ployment Insurance Law of New York I as unconstitutional and
wholly void under both federal and state constitutions.2 In acquies-
cing to complainant's request the question whether complainant was
" Panama Oil Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1935).
" Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837
(1935).-
1 Note (1931) 31 MicH. L. REV. 786 (delegation of federal legislative power
to executive or administrative agencies) ; Note (1935) 48 HARV. L. REv. 798;
Baesler, A Suggested Classification of the Decisions on Delegation of Legisla-
tive Power (1935) 15 B. U. L. REV. 507.
'N. Y. LABOR LAW (1936) §§ 502-531. In general its main features em-
brace a 3% payroll tax on all employers who maintain a staff of at least four
persons for a period of thirteen or more calendar weeks of the year in any
employment in which all or the greater part of the work is to be performed
within the state. The assessments will be pooled into a single fund, payments
from which will begin in two years. To entitle an applicant to its benefits,
he must register and subject himself to a three-week waiting period. If he
has had ninety days of employment in the preceding twelve months or one hun-
dred and thirty in the twenty-four months prior to the time his benefits are to
commence, eligibility is his. Any employee whose unemployment was through
his own wrongful conduct or other industrial controversy is penalized an addi-
tional seven weeks waiting period. A recipient of its benefits, who refuses an
offer of employment for which he is fitted, is disqualified provided that accep-
tance would not require him to join a union, or become involved in an indus-
trial dispute, or cause him to travel unreasonable distances or work for a salary
far less than paid in similar work. Payments of benefits are made in the ratio
of one week of benefits for every fifteen days of employment. These pay-
ments shall be made at the rate of fifty per centum of employee's full time
weekly wage but in no event to be more than fifteen dollars per week or less
than five. See Legis. (1935) 10 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 147.2 U. S. CONST. Amend. 14, § 1; N. Y. CoNsT. art. 1, § 6.
